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I. INTRODUCTIONO N New Year's Day 1994, while I was ice skating, a young girl
crossed suddenly in front of me. I fell to the ice in a sitting
position and "broke my back." That accident, unreal at the time,
became an encounter with modern medicine, its miracles and its
efforts to control cost. Fortunately, I have emerged from my opera-
tion and rehabilitation able to walk and function with no significant
impairment.
When my insurer determined that my continued hospitaliza-
tion was "medically inappropriate," my reactions were initially those
of all patients. Later, my experience as a patient led to some reflec-
tions both on the needs of patients who are suddenly hospitalized
and on the general process of utilization review and medical neces-
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sity decision-making.1
My experiences were of a special type: concurrent review for a
patient with a sudden trauma or illness. However, that type of in-
jury is one that raises special fears for all patients. Emergency hos-
pitalized patients have special problems in dealing with the
suddenness of injury and in obtaining information to dispute medi-
cal necessity determinations. These emergency patients especially
need timely notice of the limits on services, an identification of dis-
charge alternatives and an adequate explanation of the grounds for
denial of services.
These patients also share needs that are common to other pa-
tients. In particular, they all need to understand the underlying
basis for medical necessity determinations.2 If the determinations
are not based on professional consensus, then the patients' health
plans should indicate the support the plan relies upon for this de-
termination and the process used to develop the standards.3 The
health policies and brochures provided to subscribers should pro-
vide information on the criteria used for medical necessity determi-
nations and illustrative examples of the type of care considered
necessary for common medical conditions and for medical emer-
gencies. This information can facilitate choice by subscribers
among plans based upon the level of care provided. The develop-
ment of managed care increases the need for patients to determine
actively that the care they receive is adequate.
This article also examines the remedies available to patients
who are denied benefits. 4 The existing remedies have their draw-
backs. 5 Tort and contract suits provide recourse when a sufficient
1. A number of articles have examined the legal aspects of cost containment
and utilization review. See, e.g., William A. Helvestine, Legal Implications of Utiliza-
tion Review, in CONTROLLING COSTS AND CHANGING PATIENT CARE: THE ROLE OF
UTILIZATION MANAGEMENT, app. A at 169 (Bradford H. Gray & MarilynJ. Field eds.,
1989) (reviewing existing legal guidelines relating to utilization review decisions
and liability issues); Bradley Duncan, Judicial Review of Fiduciary Claim Denials Under
ERISA: An Alternative to the Arbitrary and Capricious Test, 71 CORNELL L. REv. 986,
1007-14 (1986) (discussingjudicial development under ERISA of two-tiered system
to review fiduciary behavior and inappropriateness of current arbitrary and capri-
cious test); Symposium, The Dark Side of Health Care Containment: Emerging Legal
Issues in Managed Care, 14 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 1 (1990) (discussing new control
and new cost methods of managed care).
2. For a discussion of the underlying basis of medical necessity determina-
tions, see infra notes 17-38 and accompanying text.
3. For a discussion of the need for clarification of the criteria for medical
necessity determinations, see infra notes 39-54 and accompanying text.
4. For a discussion of the remedies available to patients who are denied bene-
fits, see infra notes 61-111 and accompanying text.
5. For a discussion of the limitations of existing tort remedies, see infra notes
3
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injury can be demonstrated, but these remedies are preempted by
federal law in employer-sponsored health care programs. 6 Em-
ployer-sponsored plans are required to have internal grievance pro-
cedures. While judicial review is available for these procedures, it is
an unlikely recourse for minor claims.7 The pressure to control
costs in these programs can make the fairness of the process open
to question. Further, the remedies have their drawbacks in provid-
ing expeditious resolution of disputes involving prospective treat-
ment of conditions posing risks of serious impairment.
This article suggests the use of a procedural audit of the fair-
ness of a health plan's grievance system.8 Such an audit would pro-
vide some independent check on the fairness of the system and
better ensure accurate determinations. In addition, this article con-
siders the circumstances in which second opinions should be avail-
able as a part of the dispute resolution process concerning medical
necessity determinations for hospitalized patients. 9 The remedy is
especially needed for determinations when the patient may be seri-
ously impaired by the denial of benefits, when the issues involve the
factual condition of the patient or when circumstances present a
significant case for exceptions to the plan's criteria. These referrals
can provide a means for expeditious resolution of disputes when
they are most needed.
II. MEDICAL NECESSITY DETERMINATIONS FOR HOSPITALIZED
PATIENTS: TIMELY NOTICE AND DISCHARGE ALTERNATIVES
Patients hospitalized for traumatic injuries or sudden illnesses
face special difficulties. These patients and their families are con-
cerned with the medical outcome. They have not made advance
preparations to deal with the patient's discharge and do not under-
stand the options. They are less able to deal with a denial of bene-
fits and to prepare an appeal from a denial of benefits because of
their weakened condition and their hospitalized status. These limi-
64-70 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the difficulties with contract
suits as a form of relief, see infra notes 77-79 and accompanying text. For a discus-
sion of limitations of ERISA remedies, see infra notes 99-111 and accompanying
text.
6. For a discussion of ERISA as a remedy, see infra notes 80-98 and accompa-
nying text.
7. For a discussion of how minor claims are an unlikely recourse for an ag-
grieved patient, see infra notes 99-100 and accompanying text.
8. For a discussion of the need for a procedural audit, see infra notes 116-20
and accompanying text.
9. For a discussion of the need for second opinions in disputes involving risks
of serious impairment, see infra notes 121-23. and accompanying text.
[Vol. 40: p. 153
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tations accentuate the need that all these patients share for timely
notice and an adequate explanation of any denial of benefits. That
notice makes possible both planning and an opportunity to make a
meaningful appeal. This need for adequate notice arises both in
respect to traditional indemnity insurance plans and to managed
care programs that provide care and pay for it. This article refers to
third-party payers (payers) to indicate the applicability of the com-
ments to both insurers and managed care plans.
A. Experience with Medical Necessity Determination
My experience illustrates some of the difficulties encountered
by patients when they do not receive sufficient notice about reim-
bursement determinations. My spinal fracture and compressed
disc, or "broken back," necessitated an operation to stabilize the
spine. In the operation, rods were inserted to support the spine
and allow the burst disc to decompress, fortunately without any im-
pairment of the spinal cord. After the operation, it was necessary to
wear a back brace. The brace, made of heavy plastic, was uncom-
fortable to wear all day and I required assistance to put it on and
remove it. Moreover, it was very painful to sit while wearing the
brace for more than a few minutes, and the brace pressed against
the neck when seated. By the eleventh day after the operation, I
began to walk in the brace without feeling faint, but I did so very
cautiously, with a cane and with supervision. I was to receive in-
struction the next day on climbing stairs and on functioning with a
brace, before I was discharged from the hospital.
My insurance plan was a fee-for-service plan that had adopted
elements of managed care.10 Thus, for care provided in participat-
ing hospitals, there was full reimbursement, but my insurance re-
quired pre-admission review. The insurer approved admission and
a hospital stay of ten days. Even if I had heard of this time period, I
did not appreciate its significance. Late on the eleventh day after
my admission, a member of the hospital's utilization review office
brought me a copy of a fax from my insurer to my doctor notifying
my doctor that my continued stay in the hospital was "medically
inappropriate." Furthermore, the doctor's request for an addi-
tional stay had been denied. Although benefits would still cover
10. See Jerry Gray, Blue Cross Says It Plans Clinics in New Jersey, N.Y. TIMES, May
19, 1994, at B1, B7 (discussing how further effort to deliver services through health
maintenance organizations builds on April 1993 partnership with selected hospi-
tals under which they provided care at lower rates in exchange for high patient
volume).
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the date of discharge, my benefits were terminated as of the prior
day. I was stunned by the notice that my benefits had already
ended and that they had been labeled "medically inappropriate."
The utilization review officer suggested that I call my insurer to
make an appeal. When I reached the insurance review officer, how-
ever, I was told that I could not appeal even though the letter said
that the physician or patient could appeal. I protested that I could
not leave the hospital because of my difficulties with the brace and
inability to walk up steps. I was told that the insurer was not saying
that I did not need medical care, but only that I did not need medi-
cal care in an acute care facility. Because I was not receiving intra-
venous fluids, I no longer needed to be in a hospital and could be
in a semi-skilled nursing facility. I protested that I did not want to
be sent to a nursing home but instead wanted to be rehabilitated.
With that, the reviewer informed me that I could go to a rehabilita-
tion institute.11 Thus, the call ended, my appeal for continued hos-
pital benefits was denied, and I was uncertain and distressed.
There was something about being termed "medically inappropri-
ate" that seemed like a personal failing, some inability to measure
up to accepted standards.12 The denial of additional hospital bene-
fits also forced me to re-examine a more basic issue that had been
troubling to me-whether I had the ability to go home in the near
future given my weakness and difficulties with the brace.
I decided I would stop fighting the insurance company's efforts
to "evict" me from the hospital. Instead, I would initiate a request
to go to a rehabilitation institute on an inpatient basis to receive
additional care for dealing with my difficulties with the brace. My
stay in the rehabilitation institute was key to my recovery. The insti-
tute changed my ill-fitting brace, enabling me to sit in a chair.
Moreover, I had sufficient time and space to learn to walk and to
climb stairs gaining confidence in my ability. The occupational
therapist provided devices to deal with the limitations of not being
able to bend down. In addition, I had by now gathered sufficient
strength to sit up and put on the brace, eliminating my need for
11. The time needed to schedule the operation may have been a factor in
exceeding the insurer's 10-day norm for the procedure. Time lost before an oper-
ation, however, does not reduce the time needed for the patient to recover. While
the insurer did not pay for the additional days beyond the 10 days initially ap-
proved for the operation, the hospital did not bill me for the additional time.
12. This reaction may not have been strictly logical, because the care, not the
patient, was designated "medically inappropriate." However, trauma patients in
hospitals are not always logical. In addition, the term reflected some failure to
conform to the norm, either by the patient or the provider, and thus had a judg-
mental element to it.
[Vol. 40: p. 153
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special assistance after I went home.13
B. Need for Timely Notice
One lesson from this experience is that patients play an impor-
tant role in determining the care they receive. The growth of man-
aged care and the efforts to control costs will accentuate the need
for patients to play an active role in ensuring that they receive suffi-
cient care. But patients need to have sufficient information to en-
able them to have meaningful input into the decisions.
Fundamentally, patients need adequate notice about the limitations
on the benefits provided by the health plan.
The time for providing adequate notice to a patient arises dur-
ing pre-authorization or concurrent review when the payer estab-
lishes a limitation on the amount of care to be provided.
Authorization by a payer of a particular hospitalization period func-
tions as a denial of benefits for any further time. If patients, partic-
ularly hospitalized patients, are to make any appeal on a timely
basis or to request an extension of their stay, they need to know of
the limits when the limits are established. To emphasize the signifi-
cance of the limits, the insurer needs to state the limits expressly
and to indicate specifically the deadline for filing requests for ex-
tended stays, appeals and requests for exceptions.' Moreover, the
insurer must provide the information in writing to the patient or
the patient's representative. 14 The payer should also indicate how
the patient can request more information about the underlying ba-
sis for the determination.
Insurers have a fiduciary responsibility to inform patients of
their appeal rights and not to hinder appeals. 15 The failure to pro-
13. The insurer provided reimbursement for the stay in the rehabilitation
institute.
14. My benefits brochure on pre-admission review states that written confir-
mation of the authorized hospital stay is to be given by the insurer to the patient,
as well as to the provider. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of NewJersey, Your Medallion
Health Coverage Program, Addendum, Pre-admission Review (1995) ("An approval
or denial will be provided by telephone and a confirmation letter will be sent to
the patient, the Physician and the Hospital."). When such an obligation is recog-
nized, there still needs to be adequate safeguards to ensure that there is compli-
ance. For a discussion of remedies as one of the safeguards to ensure compliance,
see infra notes 61-111 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the use of proce-
dural audits as a means of providing additional safeguards, see infra notes 116-20
and accompanying text.
Medicare patients are to receive written notice from hospitals and other prov-
iders of their right to appeal denials of benefits and the practical steps to initiate
such appeals. 42 U.S.C. § 1395cc(a) (1) (M). See copy of disclosure form on file
with author.
15. See Sarchett v. Blue Cross, 729 P.2d 267 (Cal. 1987) (en banc). For a dis-
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vide a timely notice about the limitation of benefits can frustrate
the patient's ability to make an appeal or a request for an exten-
sion.16 As discussed in Part V, there needs to be adequate safe-
guards to ensure that this obligation is observed.
Of course, there can be a concern that the patient will worry
unduly and prematurely about a possible exhaustion of benefits.
Accordingly, before an operation, the insurer could provide written
notice to the patient's representative. Thereafter, the patient, who
will have to deal with the consequences of a denial, would be
informed.
C. Disclosure of Discharge Alternatives
Discharge planning is focused on home care. Sending the pa-
tient home is generally the most cost-efficient alternative. In a time
when health care providers are concerned with reducing costs of
health care, home care will undoubtedly remain a primary option.
In addition, patients in hospitals generally want to go home. In my
case, therapy was initially planned to be at home, so the discharge
planning focused on that option. It was only later, during my ap-
peal of the denial of further hospital benefits, that I found there
was another option-inpatient rehabilitation care.
In addition to discharge planning by the provider, the payer
should give trauma patients some overview information on the
range of alternatives available, including inpatient rehabilitation
and twenty-four hour assistance. Information should be provided
even if these alternatives are not the recommended ones at the
time or ones for which the insurer will routinely provide reimburse-
ment. Developments in the patient's strength, progress at therapy
cussion of other duties of fiduciaries, see infra note 74. However, in employer-
sponsored plans, the plan has a statutory fiduciary duty to members of the plan.
29 U.S.C. § 1104 (1988). SeeWeaver v. Phoenix Home Life Mut. Ins. Co., 990 F.2d
154 (4th Cir. 1993). For a discussion of Weaver, see infra notes 50-52 and accompa-
nying text.
16. The payer may maintain that it is the responsibility of the provider to give
the patient notice of the limits of coverage and the rights to appeal. Providers,
indeed, have a responsibility to help patients receive reimbursement. See E. Haavi
Morreim, Economic Disclosure and Economic Advocacy: New Duties in the Medical Stan-
dard of Care, 12J. LEGAL MED. 275, 289-301 (1991). See generally Kathleen N. Lohr,
Symposium, Commentary: Professional Peer Review in a "Competitive" Medical Market -
The Legal Implications of Health Care Containment, 36 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 1175,
1186-89 (1986).
However, the payer, not the provider, is denying the additional benefits and it
is the payer that should have the primary responsibility to provide notice and not
to hinder the patient's ability to appeal. If the payer wants to have the provider
communicate the limits to the patient, the payer should provide written copies of
the claims determination to the provider to give to the patient.
[Vol. 40: p. 153
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and ability to deal with medical equipment, such as a brace, affect
which site is appropriate for discharge. The patient is in a special
position to reassess and monitor what is needed. Knowing what op-
tions exist for future care can also bring into focus what a patient
needs to request from one's doctor as an alternative. The patient
may know special circumstances which make that care appropriate
even if it is not the norm. The payer should also have an obligation
to provide the trauma patient with written information about the
range of discharge alternatives potentially reimbursable by the
health care plan. Information from the payer is particularly impor-
tant because of the great variability of medical plans.
There may be some reluctance to recognize an obligation to
inform patients about alternative discharge options for fear of a
"moral hazard": the possibility that patients will request more care
and not try hard enough to do what they can do on their own. On
the other hand, patients may force themselves to do that which they
are physically or psychologically unprepared because they think no
alternative exists. Insurance co-payments and a clearer identifica-
tion of the criteria for the service provide better alternatives to deal
with this hazard than nondisclosure.
III. MEDICAL NECESSITY CRITERIA
Patients with any medical condition also need a better under-
standing of how payers determine the level of care that is medically
appropriate. How does a payer determine that ten days of hospitali-
zation is sufficient for a spinal fracture? Why ten days, rather than
nine, eleven or some other number? Information about the basis
on which medical necessity determinations are made should be
provided in connection with a denial of specific services. In addi-
tion, more information about the general criteria should be pro-
vided to subscribers with their basic policy.
A. Process of Medical Necessity Determinations
The traditional means of determining the medical necessity of
a medical procedure was the judgment of the patient's individual
9
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physician. 17 Initially, insurers largely deferred to that judgment.",
Moreover, denial of reimbursement was considered inappropriate
if reasonable physicians could differ about the need for it.19
The increasing concern with controlling health costs has led to
the use of utilization review even in fee-for-service plans. Admission
to a hospital is increasingly subject to pre-admission prospective re-
view and continued hospitalization is subject to concurrent review.
If the care is not deemed medically necessary or is otherwise deter-
mined to be inappropriate, benefits are denied. If prior authoriza-
tion is not obtained, a penalty is assessed even if the care is needed.
The determination of medical necessity appeals to the norm of
professional judgment, but the criteria employed are not necessar-
ily based on a professional consensus and may not even be based on
public information. The criteria can be influenced by cost-benefit
factors in various ways. In many cases, payers use a protocol for
determining the need for hospitalization. This protocol was devel-
oped through federal funding of research on inappropriate hospi-
tal stays. These protocols are public and studies have indicated
their reliability.2 0 Nevertheless, other protocols used by payers are
proprietary and lack reports on their reliability.21 Length of stay
standards are usually derived from published data on hospital stays
in Western states where stays are typically shorter.
Insurers have also used the criteria developed by private orga-
nizations, such as the RAND Corporation, to assess the appropriate-
ness of specific procedures.22 The RAND protocols were originally
17. See SYLViA A. LAw, BLUE CROSS: WHAT WENT WRONG? 115-44 (2d ed. 1976)
(commenting on role of utilization review from 1960s to mid-1970s); Mark A. Hall
& Gerald F. Anderson, Health Insurers'Assessment of Medical Necessity, 140 U. PA. L.
REv. 1637, 1644 (1992) (noting that health insurance policies traditionally did not
have "necessity" limitations and usually covered physician's request, without re-
view, as long as within policies' monetary limit); Clark C. Havighurst, Professional
Restraint on Innovation in Health Care Financing, 1978 DuKE L.J. 303.
18. Hall & Anderson, supra note 17, at 1644.
19. See Duncan v. J.C. Penney Life Ins. Co., 388 So. 2d 470, 473 (La. Ct. App.
1980) (en banc) (holding ambiguous term in policy and thus construed in favor of
insured); Mount Sinai Hosp. v. Zorek, 271 N.Y.S.2d 1012 (Civ. Ct. 1966) (finding
multiple courses of treatment available for obese patient and that physician's
choice of hospitalization over rest home care entitled patient to full coverage).
20. INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, CONTROLLING COSTS AND CHANGING PATIENT
CARE: THE ROLE OF UTILIZATION MANAGEMENT 80 (Bradford H. Gray & Marilyn J.
Field eds., 1989) [hereinafter IOM, CONTROLLING COSTS] (describing appropriate-
ness of evaluation protocol (AEP) criteria).
21. See id. (noting that certain protocols, such as ISD-A (intensity of services,
severity of illness, discharges and appropriateness screens) have no reports judging
their reliability).
22. See id. at 83 (noting that former RAND Corporation researchers devel-
oped "review protocols for procedures . . . [which] involve a series of questions
[Vol. 40: p. 153
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developed by convening panels of "distinguished physicians" who
reviewed the literature, used their own judgment and, after discus-
sion, developed a group consensus rating of appropriateness.2 3
The guidelines of Millman & Robertson have recently become
the "most influential" among scores of health care plans.2 4 The
standards are developed not by leading academic researchers, but
by consultant doctors and nurses-often from Health Maintenance
Organizations (HMOs) -- based on a study of medical charts and
medical literature.25 The guidelines do not have input from medi-
cal groups and are often criticized by medical associations.2 6 The
validity of the guidelines in improving care while lowering costs is
being studied for the first time by an academically-affiliated plan.27
The criteria used by insurers and other third-party payers are
also modified by the plans in various ways. Although some may use
the criteria to state a specific length of stay approved for hospitaliza-
tion, others will use the norm as a guide for scheduling continued
reviews.2 8 The criteria of utilization management organizations are
also in "a continuous process of modification." 29 These modifica-
tions may be made by the medical director after consultation with
physician reviewers and outside consultants and may follow a litera-
ture review. Plans also provide for exceptions to their criteria.30
These plans also may utilize medical practice guidelines in de-
veloping their reimbursement criteria. The development of medi-
cal practice guidelines originated with physician organizations and
professional societies generally led their development.31 In more
.... The answers are evaluated through scaling and other techniques to deter-
mine whether the proposed care is indicated.").
23. Jan Blustein & Theodore R. Marmor, Cutting Waste by Making Rules:
Promises, Pitfalls, and Realistic Prospects, 140 U. PA. L. REv. 1543, 1550 (1992).
24. Allen R. Myerson, Helping Health Insurers Say No: Having a Caesarean? You
Get 2 Days in the Hospital, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 1995, at D1.
25. See id. at D5 (stating that doctors and nurses work on updating and writing
new standards based on medical charts and academic literature).
26. See id. (commenting that many associations and hospitals do not "swallow
them whole," referring to Millman's standards).
27. See id. (noting that Harvard Community Health Plan has begun study to
determine whether Millman's guidelines actually lowers costs).
28. See IOM, CONTROLLING COSTS, supra note 20, at 82-83.
29. Id. at 84.
30. Id. at 79.
31. INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, GUIDELINES FOR CLINICAL PRACTICE - FROM DEVEL-
OPMENT TO USE 46-47 (Marilyn J. Field & Kathleen N. Lohr eds., 1992) [hereinaf-
ter IOM, GUIDELINES FOR CLINICAL PRACTICE]; see Rand E. Rosenblatt, Equality,
Entitlement, and National Health Care Reform: The Challenge of Managed Competition and
Managed Care, 60 BRoon-. L. REv. 105, 126-37 (1994) (discussing difficulties identi-
fied by 1OM Report).
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recent years, public and private payers have been interested in us-
ing guidelines as a possible means of controlling costs, a develop-
ment that has been "a major source of anxiety" for professional
groups involved in developing guidelines.32
In a review of the use of medical practice guidelines, the Insti-
tute of Medicine (Institute) identified the defining characteristic of
the medical practice guidelines as assisting patients and practition-
ers in making decisions.33 Developing criteria to evaluate the deci-
sions and reviewing the reimbursement of medical care serve
different purposes, although the criteria do and should build on
guidelines, and "science-based" guidelines can serve as a tool in re-
ducing unnecessary care.34
To make the expanded use of medical practice guidelines
more appropriate, the Institute recommended that future guide-
lines indicate the strength of the evidence upon which they are
based, as well as projections of the health and cost outcomes of
different treatments.3 5 Scientific data should have "precedence" as
the basis for support for the guidelines, but studies may not be
available, and the guidelines should indicate whether they are
based on studies, on consensus or some other basis.3 6 Considera-
tion should also be given to establishing an organization to evaluate
the guidelines issued by various organizations, because the guide-
32. 1OM, GUIDELINES FOR CLINICAL PRACTICE, supra note 31, at 112; see id. at 41
(noting that organizations and individuals may refer to practice guidelines in ef-
fort to structure organizational procedures, to guide equipment purchases and hir-
ing decisions and prioritizing efforts to improve performance); id. 60-61
(discussing fact that in 1990, American Medical Association, RAND Corporation
and Academic Medical Center Consortium signed memorandum of agreement to
develop appropriateness criteria and to convert them into practice guidelines for
physicians' everyday use).
33. Id. at 2; see also INSTrrUTE OF MEDICINE, CLINICAL PRACTICE GUIDELINES:
DIRECrIONS FOR A NEW PROGRAM 8 (MarilynJ. Field & Kathleen N. Lohr eds., 1990)
[hereinafter 1OM, DiRncriONS FOR A NEW PROGRAM] (discussing various meanings
given to term "guidelines" and recommending distinct terms).
34. Id. at 2-3. The Institute was uncertain whether the expanded use of guide-
lines would ultimately reduce health costs, noting the limited base of scientific
knowledge for developing guidelines and the possibility the guidelines would indi-
cate the need for more care. Id. at 4.
35. Id. at 27; see id. at 199 (noting that "weak [quality control] procedures and
products" are common with respect to guidelines and review criteria); see also TOM,
DiRc-riONs FOR A NEW PROGRAM, supra note 33, at 6 (finding that, in general, there
are "deficiencies" in the "systematic development, implementation and evaluation
of practice guidelines based on rigorous clinical research and soundly generated
professional consensus"); id. at 15 ("The field also suffers from imperfect and in-
complete scientific knowledge.").
36. IOM, GUIDELINES FOR CLINICAL PRAcrICE, supra note 31, at 32-33; see also
Blustein & Marmor, supra note 23, at 1548-49 (noting that research is expensive to
gather, is never exact and is usually outdated before the study is completed).
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lines "vary enormously in quality" and their use is becoming more
significant.37 The review criteria used by payers should also be
available to practitioners and others affected in an effort to increase
their acceptance. 3
B. Need for Clarification of Criteria for Medical Necessity
Determinations
1. Clarification of Basis
Medical necessity determinations, thus, reflect various bases
and differ in their underlying support. Some of the criteria for
medical necessity determinations reflect consensus standards of the
profession about minimally acceptable practices. Some may be sup-
ported by scientific studies. Other standards reflect the views of
particular experts. Some criteria may be regarded as proprietary
and may vary by insurance program. In addition, there is an ambi-
guity about the meaning of terms such as "medical necessity,"3 9
"medically inappropriate" and "waste."40 The terms "medically in-
appropriate" and "waste" can be used to refer to services that are
unacceptable based on the standards recognized by the medical
community, by other tests developed by some experts or by the plan
itself.4 1
To promote a clearer understanding, the terms "medical ne-
cessity" and "medical inappropriateness," when used alone in an
insurance plan or claims determination, should refer to the stan-
dard of what reasonable professionals would regard as either an ac-
ceptable practice or an unacceptable practice. This recognition
can be based on medical custom or standards of leading profes-
sional organizations that reflect a general professional consensus,
supported by scientific studies when available. The standard would
37. 1OM, GUIDELINES FOR CLINICAL PRACTICE, supra note 31, at 210.
38. Id. at 17; see also 1OM, CONTROLLING COSTS, supra note 20, at 6 ("The
review criteria... should be available for outside scrutiny. Physicians, purchasers
and patients should know the basis for judgments about the site, timing, and need
for care"); 1OM, DIRECTIONS FOR A NEW PROGRAM, supra note 25, at 13 (arguing
that guidelines used for utilization review need to be "public with respect to their
content and their development process").
39. See Helvestine, supra note 1, at 172-73 (finding that term "medically neces-
sary" is "difficult to define" and "frequently confused with other terms," which "can
result in wrong decisions" and care is needed to delineate basis for denial under
definition).
40. See Blustein & Marmor, supra note 23, at 1546-47 (finding that "medical
waste" and "inappropriateness" have various meanings and can refer to ineffective
treatment, treatment of uncertain effectiveness and ethically debated treatment,
such as expensive care for very sick).
41. Id.
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thus be one where reasonable physicians would not disagree about
the standard and would permit denial of claims only when the ser-
vice would be inconsistent with accepted practice.
This is not to say, however, that a third-party payer should only
be able to deny benefits if it meets the consensus standards of the
medical profession. The profession may have had little reason in
the past to determine what care is excessive and liability concerns
may have created disincentives to do so. More care is not necessar-
ily better care, though no studies indicate which approach is bet-
ter.42 Moreover, the traditional standard left much to thejudgment
of the individual physician and there could be considerable variabil-
ity in the level of care provided.
The concern with cost containment has created an interest in
limiting care. When the plan seeks to limit reimbursement within
the realm where reasonable physicians differ, the plan should
clearly indicate its standards and the supporting basis. The plan
itself should state that claims can be denied as medically unneces-
sary based not only on criteria that reflect a professional consensus,
but also on the plan's criteria for what is medically unnecessary.
The nature of the plan's criteria, the general sources of support
and the process for the formulation of criteria should be identified.
Thus, if the criteria regularly relies on expert opinions, the identity
and qualifications of the experts should be identified. If the crite-
ria are developed based on the insurer's experience with similar
claims, this source should be identified. If the determination is
based on cost factors and cost-benefit determinations, these factors
should be clearly stated in the policy and the relevant determina-
tion. When the support relies on medical practice guidelines, the
statement should indicate how the guidelines are developed and
the type of support used for the guidelines.
The plan's criteria should be supported by a valid medical
judgment. The criteria should be based on more than a difference
in views and should have more support than that available to an
individual practitioner. Such additional support is fairly implied
when a denial is based on a determination that a physician's judg-
ment represents unnecessary medical services, even when the plan
states its standards. 43 The patient chooses the particular physician
42. Cf Rand E. Rosenblatt, Medicaid Primaiy Care Case Management, the Doctor-
Patient Relationship, and the Politics of Privatization, 36 CASE W. Rls. L. REv. 915, 933-
39 (1986) (discussing relationship between patient-centered ideal of health care
and cost containment, as well as additional issues presented by cost-cutting meas-
ures that affect low-income consumers).
43. See Franks v. Louisiana Health Servs. & Indem. Co., 382 So. 2d 1064, 1068
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and relies on the individual physician's best judgment within the
realm where opinions differ. If the plan is to supersede that judg-
ment, then the plan should have the burden of affirmatively show-
ing that the alternative care is adequate. That support should
consist of something more than the views of another physician
whom the patient has not chosen and who may have no legal obli-
gation to the patient with respect to the quality of the care.44
2. Disclosure of Illustrative Benefits
The health care plans and brochures provided to subscribers
should also provide illustrative examples of the level of care consid-
ered medically necessary for a representative number of medical
conditions. The disclosures should cover not only the most fre-
quent types of procedures, but also the ones for which the stan-
dards are especially prone to vary. 45
In addition, examples should be listed of the limits on benefits
provided for the most common medical emergencies involving hos-
pitalization. The disclosure should indicate the length of hospital
stay typically authorized and the availability of post-discharge care,
such as physical therapy, in-patient rehabilitation care or home
health aides. The plan should also explain the basis underlying the
illustrative criteria.
3. Need for Clarification of Benefits and Grounds for Denials
a. Patient Choice Among Plans and Planning
This approach to the interpretation of the insurance provisions
can promote informed patient choice among plans with respect to
this key factor. If the policies clearly identify the basis upon which
medical necessity determinations are made and provide illustra-
tive examples, subscribers can consider this factor in exercising
whatever choice they may have among plans.
These criteria for determination of what is medically necessary
have important consequences for patients and their families. The
length-of-stay criteria can involve the shifting of the responsibility
(La. Ct. App. 1980) (holding that contract provision allowing denial of benefits in
discretion of insurer's medical director did not permit denial at whim, but re-
quired "honest, sincere efforts" and use of medical experts; criteria was met when
insurer used two physicians to evaluate need).
44. For a discussion of the limited applicability of tort liability to those in-
volved in utilization review, see infra notes 65-70 and accompanying text.
45. See IOM, CorrROLLINo COSTS, supra note 20, at 82-84 (surveying varia-
tions in criteria for tonsillectomies and for low back pain, procedures where varia-
tions are predictable).
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for providing care during recuperation from an institution to family
members. 46 Subscribers who receive better notice of the limits of
services can consider what alternative strategies they may need to
undertake to deal with the limits, such as making alternative ar-
rangements for home care.
The disclosures, thus, can facilitate planning by patients and
help them in choosing among plans. In many cases, though, the
choice between plans is limited to those made available by employ-
ers, and people with lower incomes may have fewer choices.47 The
disclosures may still be useful in enabling the employees to per-
suade their employer to seek changes in the plans. In addition, as
citizens, subscribers may seek legislation to change restrictions that
are not publicly acceptable. 48
b. Inducement for Cooperation in Development of Criteria
The distinction made in the plan's policy between those crite-
ria based on professionally-accepted standards and those based on
the plan's own criteria may indirectly encourage more efforts by
payers to work with the profession to develop more consensus stan-
dards. The disclosure of variations between the plans may spur
some efforts at coordination. There may also be some public resist-
ance to standards that are "the insurer's" rather than those of the
profession. Such public resistance could provide more incentive
for the development of widely-accepted standards.
c. Patient Reassurance
When a specific claim is denied, the payer should also provide
an explanation of the denial that indicates the basis for the criteria
used for the denial. The information may provide some reassur-
ance to the patient that the denial has substantial support and is
fair. The patient may be less inclined to pursue an appeal if the
grounds are satisfactorily explained.
46. Hospitals Cost Too Much for Long Birth Stays Shifting the Burden, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 23, 1994, at A18 (noting that early dismissal of husband from hospital made it
necessary for wife to stay home from work to provide care).
47. See Hall & Anderson, supra note 17, at 1645.
48. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:48-61 (West 1995) (enacted June 28, 1995) (re-
quiring minimum of 48 hours of in-patient care following vaginal delivery and min-
imum of 96 hours of in-patient care following cesarean section for mother and
newly-born child); Tragedy Spurs Bill on Post-Birth Hospital Stays, STAR LEDGER (New-
ark), June 2, 1995, at 65 (discussing extension of hospital stays after childbirth).
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d. Removing Obstacles to Appeals and Disclosing Proprietary
Data
An adequate explanation of the basis for a denial is also neces-
sary to enable a patient to pursue his or her rights to an appeal. If
the patient is to have a meaningful opportunity to appeal or request
an exception, the explanation for the specific determination
should reflect whether the denial is based on consensus profes-
sional standards or some other basis. Insurers have a fiduciary re-
sponsibility not to obstruct appeals.49
To facilitate an appeal, the underlying data supporting the spe-
cific determination needs to be available to the patient. A denial of
benefits merely because the patient exceeded the insurer's author-
ized time for hospitalization was found by the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit to be inconsistent with the in-
surer's responsibility to provide specific reasons for the denial in
Weaver v. Phoenix Home Life Mutual Insurance Co.50 In Weaver, the
insurer maintained that the norms for hospital stays developed by
its consultant were proprietary and their value would be lost if dis-
closed.51 Nonetheless, the court found that the insurer was obliged
to make arrangements with its consultant to permit both sufficient
disclosure and an effective appeal.5 2
4. Clarification of the Term Medically Necessary
These changes could, of course, be adopted by legislation.
Some clarification of the meaning of medical necessity in the policy
can also be justified as needed to provide an appropriate interpreta-
tion of the contractual provisions. The contractual exclusion of
medically unnecessary claims provides little guidance as to the test
that will be used. The term by itself suggests to patients that the
treating physician's judgment fails to meet minimally acceptable
medical standards, implying that these are the standards that the
49. For a discussion of insurer's fiduciary responsibilities, see supra note 15
and accompanying text, and infra notes 73-75, 89-91 and accompanying text.
50. 990 F.2d 154, 158-59 (4th Cir. 1993). The court denied summary judg-
ment for the insurer and granted summary judgment to the patient who was ad-
mitted to the hospital for alcoholism for a pre-approved 12-day stay but who
actually stayed 30 days at the recommendation of his physician and independent
consultant. Id. Furthermore, the insurer was required to state "specific reasons"
for limiting the stay to 12 days. Id. Plans subject to ERISA must provide "specific
reasons" for denials of benefits. See 29 U.S.C. § 1104 (1985) (identifying fiduciary
responsibilities of ERISA plans). For a discussion of fiduciary responsibilities
under ERISA, see infra notes 81-84 and accompanying text.
51. Weaver, 990 F.2d at 158-59.
52. Id. at 158.
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profession recognizes. This interpretation is in accord with the
traditional interpretation of the provisions of the contract. 53 When
the policy is intended to permit denial of services based on factors
in addition to those that reflect consensus professional standards,
the contract should indicate the additional grounds for denial gen-
erally used. If the insurer fails to provide this information in its
policy or in the explanation for a specific denial, the determination
should be viewed as governed only by criteria for which there is a
professional consensus.
Some plans may, in addition, provide that the determination of
medical necessity is to be made by the plan or rests "in the sole
discretion" of the plan's medical director or a peer review organiza-
tion.54 Such a provision does not eliminate the need for the clarifi-
cation suggested here. The provision can be read as allowing the
plan to make the determination, but not as resolving the test that
should be used in making the determination. The director and the
peer review organization should be viewed as being required to use
consensus professionally recognized standards in their determina-
tions, unless the plan provisions go further and indicate that the
criteria for the medical necessity determination permit other bases
to be considered.
This clarification of the meaning of medical necessity should
not impair utilization review and the efforts at cost containment.
Rather, it is made necessary by the increased importance of utiliza-
tion review. The clarification would not preclude plans from hav-
ing distinct criteria. It would, though, promote greater
accountability by making the basis of the determinations better
known to those affected and facilitating patient choice.
53. Mount Sinai Hosp. v. Zorek, 271 N.Y.S.2d 1012, 1018 (Civ. Ct. 1966); see
Annotation, What Services, Equipment, or Supplies Are "Medically Necessary"for Purposes
of Coverage Under Medical Insurance, 75 A.L.R. 4TH 763 (1990); cf. Bucci v. Blue
Cross-Blue Shield of Conn., Inc., 764 F. Supp. 728 (D. Conn. 1991) (finding that
experimental treatments can be excluded only if medically unnecessary, as deter-
mined by whether no reasonable segment of the medical community would accept
treatment as within appropriate range of medical treatment in circumstances of
case); see Hall & Anderson, supra note 17, at 1650, 1655 (noting that contract cases
in past left medical necessity determination to physician's good faith judgment
and insurers continue to lose under contract revisions allowing utilization review).
54. See Pirozzi v. Blue Cross-Blue Shield of Va., 741 F. Supp. 586, 589 (E.D. Va.
1990) (citing examples of plan provisions); Franks v. Louisiana Health Servs. &
Indem. Co., 382 So. 2d 1064, 1068 (La. Ct. App. 1980) (holding that contract
provision permitting denials in discretion of medical director did not permit de-
nial at whim, but required sincere efforts and use of medical experts).
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IV. PROCEDURES AND REMEDIES
From a patient's standpoint, there are drawbacks to the ex-
isting procedures and remedies to dispute a denial of claims based
on the lack of medical necessity. The typical claims process and the
potential forums for relief from incorrect decisions are considered
below.
A. Procedures of the Payers
Decisions about the medical necessity of a procedure are typi-
cally made initially by a claims reviewer who is not a physician. The
final denial of benefits, though, is reviewed by a physician. The
claims reviewer is to obtain information sufficient to make a deter-
mination and obtain a medical consultation when needed.
The appeals processes are diverse. Under most plans, a review
may be made by a physician adviser, the medical director or a com-
mittee.55 Some plans provide that the decision-maker on the ap-
peal may not have been involved in the initial decision.5 6 Appeals
are to be resolved by written decisions.
While in the hospital, the patient may not have a direct role in
this internal appeals process, because part of the appeals may be
handled by the treating physician. As a practical matter, leaving the
appeal to the doctor is often the best course. The issues are medi-
cal questions and the doctor can be the best advocate in addressing
issues regarding professional standards. Indeed, the development
of cost containment has given doctors a responsibility for "eco-
nomic advocacy" on behalf of their patients. 57 Doctors also have
considerable success on appeals in obtaining authorization for
some additional benefits, as reviewers and doctors negotiate care
alternatives that they can both accept.58 The patient should be in-
formed that the appeal is being made and should have the opportu-
nity to participate.
55. IOM, CONTROLLING COSTS, supra note 20, at 85.
56. See generally AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION GUIDELINES FOR HEALTH
BENEFITS ADMINISTRATION-CONcURRENT REVIEW AND GENERAL ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEDURES (1990); GUIDELINES FOR HEALTH BENEFITS ADMINISTRATION-PRIOR
AUTHORIZATION, AND CLAIMS SUBMISSION AND REVIEW (1990). For an overview of
the process, see Jesperson & Kendell, Utilization Review: Avoiding Liability While Con-
trolling Health Costs, 4 HEALTHSPAN, No. 7, at 3 (1987).
57. Morreim, supra note 16 (discussing economic advocacy by physicians for
benefit of their patients).
58. IOM, COrrROLLING COSTS, supra note 20, at 77; Hall & Anderson, supra
note 17, at 1658 (noting that doctors reach accord in all but 1-2% of cases); cf.
Blustein & Marmor, supra note 23, at 1551 (finding that physician appeals reduced
denials from 15% to 9% in trial run).
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The doctor faces some disincentive in continuing appeals, be-
cause the appeals are time-consuming and frustrating for doctors as
they work their way through the layers of utilization reviewers.5 9
Before care is provided, a physician has an economic incentive to
support the allowance of benefits, but after the surgery or other
medical procedure has occurred, the economic incentive is less-
ened. The doctor's reimbursement from the insurer is fixed at cus-
tomary rates and will not increase for time spent in pursuing
appeals in an individual case.60 The doctor may also be precluded
from charging the patient additional fees if the physician is a partic-
ipating member of the insurer's health plan. The payer, thus, af-
fects the compensation of the provider to whom the patient looks
for advocacy with respect to the claim. From the patient's stand-
point, the patient may need to take a more direct role in pursing
the appeal in this setting.
B. Tort Liability as a Remedy
1. Liability of the Treating Physician
When reimbursement is denied, the treating physician must
advise the patient on whether to continue treatment and the physi-
cian will have to decide whether to pursue an appeal of the in-
surer's determination. If the treating physician acquiesces in the
insurer's denial and does not recommend further treatment, the
patient may have a tort claim against the doctor if an injury occurs
as a result of premature discharge. 61
The standard for judging the physician's conduct is based on a
professional standard of reasonable care. Medical necessity deci-
sions can fall into a "grey area," though, on whether additional care
is needed. If reasonable physicians differ on the need, the physi-
cian may not be in violation of the professional standard and there
may be no malpractice liability for not seeking the additional
care.
62
59. See Gerald W. Grumet, Health Care Rationing Through Inconvenience: The
Third Party's Secret Weapon, 321 NEw ENG. J. MED. 607, 608 (1989); see State MDs
Prescribe Own Health Insurance, STAR LEDGER (Newark), Mar. 24, 1994, at 1, 19 (dis-
cussing physicians who are starting own plan in response to "hassle factor" involved
in medical necessity reviews).
60. See Morreim, supra note 16, at 308 ("The physician ... will increasingly be
embroiled in ... appeals procedures, for which the time spent is ordinarily not
billable.").
61. If the physician believes further treatment is needed that will not be reim-
bursed by the insurer, the physician will face a dilemma if the patient is unable to
pay privately for the care.
62. The tort standard should not necessarily be the contract standard for de-
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The lack of tort liability, when reasonable opinions differ, can
remove some of the incentive to resist the payer's denial of benefits,
even though the treating physician reasonably believes the care is
necessary. As physicians are influenced by utilization review to pro-
vide less care, the professional standard as to the care needed may
also change. 63
2. Tort Liability of Reviewers and Insurer
If the patient is injured as a result of an early discharge from a
hospital because of a denial of insurance benefits, the plan could
be subject to tort liability, but only in limited circumstances. Tort
suits are preempted in the case of employer-sponsored health plans
that are qualified plans under the Federal Employment Retirement
Income Security Act (ERISA).64 Because ERISA generally covers
those who receive their insurance through their employer, tort lia-
bility is precluded for many utilization review decisions.
In private health plans not covered by ERISA, establishing tort
liability of reviewers presents considerable difficulties. The stan-
dard for determining negligence of those responsible for the review
will reflect the need to abide by the professional standards of medi-
cal care.65 If reasonable physicians can differ, there will be no lia-
bility for a denial, even though the provision of additional care
termining what care is medically necessary under the plan. The lack of tort liabil-
ity when reasonable physicians differ is appropriate because the patient has chosen
the physician and is only entitled to receive the physician's best judgment within
the range of reasonable care. However, denying benefits as medically unnecessary
when reasonable physicians differ, based on the views of experts, or other authori-
ties, presents a different issue. The patient has not chosen to rely on the opinions
of these experts and the patient loses the benefit of the treating physician's indi-
vidual best judgment. If benefits are to be denied as medically unnecessary when
reasonable physicians differ, the plan's criteria should be clearly identified so that
the patient can decide whether to rely on these standards. For a discussion of the
process of medical necessity determinations, see supra notes 17-38 and accompany-
ing text.
63. Helvestine, supra note 1, at 177-78 (finding that to some extent, criteria is
"self-validating" as criteria that comes into widespread use becomes the community
standard); IOM, CONTROLLING COSTS, supra note 20, at 95 (noting that use of utili-
zation review reduced hospital stays for procedures even for patients not covered
by program).
64. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1988); seeJohnson v. District 2 Marine Eng'rs Benefi-
cial Ass'n, 857 F.2d 514 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that state law fraud and inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress claims are pre-empted under ERISA). In
Corcoran v. United Healthcare, Inc., 965 F.2d 1321 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S.
Ct. 812 (1992), the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit criticized
the preclusion of damages when errors led to injury and urged Congressional re-
form. Corcoran, 965 F.2d at 1338.
65. See Helvestine, supra note 1, at 177.
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would also have been a reasonable judgment.66 '
Even if breach of duty of care by the reviewers can be estab-
lished, establishing causation remains a major difficulty for patients
in bringing tort suits against insurers. When the doctor fails to ap-
peal a case, the reviewers may not be liable, even if the reviewers
were negligent in denying benefits, on the grounds that the review-
ers did not cause the injury.67 Instead the doctor, in discharging
the patient, may be seen as the cause of the injury. This narrow
view of causation has been criticized as inconsistent with more mod-
em theories of causation and with a more realistic assessment of the
effects of a denial of benefits. 68 Consequently, at least one recent
case has held that a reviewer can be liable in tort if the denial of
benefits was a substantial factor in causing injury to a patient.69
One lesson that reviewers may have learned from these devel-
opments is that to protect themselves from any risk of liability, the
reviewers should have the "concurrence" of the treating physician
with the review decision.70 If the doctor agrees and does not ap-
peal, the discharge may be seen as the doctor's decision, not the
insurer's responsibility under the more limited view of causation.
As a result, the concern for tort liability on the part of reviewers
66. Id. at 178 (suggesting that in close cases, it is advisable for reviewers to
research literature or data that provides basis for disagreeing with physician who
persists in believing additional care is needed).
67. In Wickline v. California, 239 Cal. Rptr. 810 (Ct. App. 1986), the insurer's
denial of benefits was not considered the cause of injury because the doctor dis-
charged the patient without an appeal. Wickline, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 819. However,
the case is ambiguous because further hospitalization may not have avoided the
injury and other physicians concurred in discharge as acceptable practice. Id. at
817-19.
68. See John D. Blum, An Analysis of Legal Liability in Health Care Utilization
Review and Case Management, 26 Hous. L. REv. 191, 200 (1989) (discussing insurer's
liability in case management); E. Haavi Morreim, Whodunit? Causal Responsibility of
Utilization Review for Physicians'Decisions, Patient's Outcomes, 20 L. MED. & HEALTH
CARE 40 (1992).
69. Wilson v. Blue Cross of S. Cal., 271 Cal. Rptr. 876 (Ct. App. 1990). When
a patient who was discharged by his doctor after his insurance benefits terminated
committed suicide as a result of the early discharge, the insurer, as well as the
physician, could be regarded as a "substantial factor" that caused the injury,
notwithstanding that the discharge was made by the physician, and that the physi-
cian did not pursue informal reconsideration opportunities. Id. at 883. The court
relied on the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 431 (1977) for the substantial
factor test. Id.
70. See Michael A. Dowell, Avoiding HMO Liability for Utilization Review, 23 U.
TOL. L. REv. 117 (1991) (noting that concurrence by attending physician is "one of
the[ir] best shields against utilization review liability"); Richard A. Hinden &
Douglas L. Elden, Liability Issues for Managed Care Entities, 14 SETON HALL LEGIS. J.
1, 57-58 (1990) (recommending procedures to be undertaken prior to denial of
claims).
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may play some role in encouraging negotiation and compromises
with the treating physician.
3. Additional Factors Limiting Usefulness of Tort Suits
In practice, few lawsuits are actually brought on the tort theory
against reviewers. From the patient's standpoint, particularly an in-
patient facing concurrent review, a tort suit has its limits, because it
is retrospective and requires a showing of injury. When the patient
is in the hospital, the patient is concerned with receiving the care
that is needed. Furthermore, the denial of benefits can cause a risk
of loss that, fortunately for the patient if not the lawsuit, is not real-
ized. Premature discharge can also cause hardship that may not
produce a tangible injury that can justify a tort suit. Thus, tort suits
provide only a limited check on benefit denials. It may benefit pa-
tients most by encouraging compromises between the utilization re-
viewers and the physician about the level of care.
C. The Insurers Obligations Based on Contract: The Insurer as
Fiduciary
1. Private Insurance Not Covered by ERISA: Contract Actions and
Fiduciary Obligations
The insurer has an obligation to the patient under contract. In
early years, claimants had some success as the courts were deferen-
tial to the doctor's determination of medical necessity. 71 With in-
creasing concern about health care costs in the 1970s, insurers
wrote express provisions into contracts concerning cost contain-
ment and the denial of benefits for medically unnecessary proce-
dures. The insurers have had only limited success in contract suits
when litigated.72
71. Mount Sinai Hosp. v. Zorek, 271 N.Y.S.2d 1012, 1015 (Civ. Ct. 1966)
(holding that standard for judging necessity of treatment prescribed is care consid-
ered necessary by treating physician so long as reasonable physician could agree);
see Hall & Anderson, supra note 17, at 1644-45.
72. See Hall & Anderson, supra note 17, at 1644-55 (discussing cases through
the late 80s and their relative rarity); Annotation, supra note 53, at 763; see, e.g.,
Taylor v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 775 F.2d 1457 (11th Cir. 1985); Ex parte Blue
Cross-Blue Shield, 401 So. 2d 783 (Ala. 1981) (holding that medical necessity is
jury issue when treating physician testified services unnecessary but had admitted
patient to hospital); Ponder v. Blue Cross, 193 Cal. Rptr. 632, 643 (Ct. App. 1983)
(holding that exclusion was invalid because exclusion of coverage not sufficiently
clear); Abernathy v. Prudential Ins. Co., 264 S.E.2d 836, 837-38 (S.C. 1980) (hold-
ing that treatment is medically necessary if it is medically appropriate, but does not
have to be medically essential). A contract provision allowing denial of benefits in
the discretion of the insurer's medical director did not permit denial at whim, but
required "honest,, sincere efforts" and the use of medical experts; the criteria was
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Insurers are also considered fiduciaries under insurance law
and can be liable for bad faith in paying claims. Because this theory
is a tort theory, punitive damages may be recoverable, making litiga-
tion a more realistic alternative.7 3 The insurers are obliged to give
the subscriber's interest "at least as much" consideration as it gives
its own interest.74 Bad faith may be shown if the insurer has a pat-
tern of denying routine claims, uses a process that fails to consider
relevant information or makes it difficult for claimants to pursue
their rights. An example of bad faith is not informing claimants of
appeal rights or by failing to provide adequate information. 75
This theory potentially provides some relief with respect to the
problems of a failure to provide sufficient notice of benefits or the
grounds for denial, when these failures may frustrate the ability to
seek benefits or appeal. The theory might also be of some applica-
bility if the insurer's appeal procedures could themselves be shown
to be unfair. While the theory may provide some relief, the scope
of the principle remains largely untested.76
2. Difficulties with Contract Suits as a Form of Relief
Contract suits provide a means of retrospective relief, with the
decision being made independently by a judge or jury; however,
there are difficulties with contract suits as an effective form of relief
for mistaken decisions. In employer-sponsored health plans, the
common-law contract suit is not available and is instead replaced by
the grievance and review procedures provided by ERISA.77
When a contract action is available, the amount of damages
that may be recovered for mere economic loss may not be sufficient
met when the insurer used two physicians to evaluate the need. Franks v. Louisi-
ana Health Servs. & Indem. Co., 382 So. 2d 1064 (La. Ct. App. 1980).
73. Blum, supra note 68, at 211.
74. Silberg v. California Life Ins. Co., 521 P.2d 1103, 1108-09 (Cal. 1980)
(finding that implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in every insurance
contract required insurer to give interests of insured equal consideration to its own
interests).
75. Sarchett v. Blue Shield, 729 P.2d 267, 276 (Cal. 1987) (en banc) (holding
good faith requires insurer to inform insured of his remedial rights); Davis v. Blue
Cross, 600 P.2d 1060, 1063 (Cal. 1979) (en banc) (holding insurer's failure to
inform insured of arbitration rights constituted breach of duty of good faith);
Blum, supra note 68, at 211;Joanne B. Stern, Bad Faith Suits: Are They Applicable to
Health Maintenance Organizations?, 85 W. VA. L. REv. 911 (1983) (arguing for appli-
cation of bad faith suits to HMOs as method for policing their conduct); Linda
Tiano, The Legal Implications of HMO Cost Containment Measures, 14 SETON HALL
LEGIS. J. 79, 90 (1990) (discussing generally bad faith claims against insurers).
76. See Blum, supra note 68, at 193; Stem, supra note 75, at 913-15.
77. See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1988) (regarding ERISA preemption of state
claims).
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to make litigation worthwhile for smaller claims. 78 If the patient
leaves the hospital because of the denial of benefits, it may also be
difficult to establish that the patient has damages when the patient
suffers no further physical injury,79 and does not incur costs to re-
place the services lost. Continued hospitalization, though, may
have reduced a risk of injury that will not seem as valuable an inter-
est if the risk does not materialize.
A recovery in a lawsuit afterwards does not help an inpatient
obtain care at the time it is needed, unless the patient initially pays
for the care. Many patients may not be able to afford to pay pri-
vately. Even patients with some resources may be cautious about
paying for care, not knowing what further expenses may arise from
their illness. In this time of concern with cost containment, the
designation of care as "medically unnecessary" can influence pa-
tients and providers to forego care unless the determination can be
changed.
D. ERISA Plans and Remedies
Federal law preempts recovery under common law for contract
as well as tort actions for any dispute that "relates to" an employer-
funded health plan governed by ERISA.80 Many health plans pro-
vided as an employment benefit fall within this preemption from
common-law remedies. The plans may be self-funded or adminis-
tered by health insurers on behalf of the employer. The benefi-
ciaries are limited to the remedies provided under the federal
statute. The beneficiaries can use the grievance procedures, that
the plan must establish and the beneficiaries can seek judicial re-
view to correct arbitrary decisions.
1. Remedies Provided: Internal Grievance Procedures
The plans are recognized, by law, to have fiduciary responsibili-
ties to their beneficiaries81 and are required to provide an internal
78. See Tiano, supra note 75, at 91. To the extent the denial of benefits causes
physical injury, the liability turns on the same issues as in a tort suit. Id.
79. See 5 CORBIN ON CorrRAcrs § 1002 (1964) (noting damages may be mea-
sured by savings in cost caused by breach).
80. See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1988); Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41,
57 (1987) (finding ERISA preemption provision excludes claims based on state
common-law bad-faith claim); Blum, supra note 68, at 201-06 (analyzing and dis-
cussing exceptions from preemption).
81. 29 U.S.C. § 1104 (1988) (outlining fiduciary responsibilities of ERISA
plan administrators); see Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 115
(1989) (holding standard for review for breach of fiduciary duty is not "arbitrary
and capricious" but is de novo review).
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grievance procedure to patients. The aim is to permit the plans to
operate not only "without the formality or limitations of adversarial
proceedings, but also to protect a plan participant from arbitrary or
unprincipled decision-making."8 12 The law requires that plan ad-
ministrators give patients "specific reasons" for denials of benefits
and a "reasonable opportunity... [for] a full and fair review" of the
denial.8 3 The implementing regulations require the disclosure of
any additional material or information necessary for a claimant to
perfect an appeal.8 4
An oral hearing need not be provided to claimants.8 5 The ap-
peal can also be decided by the plan administrators who made the
initial determination.8 6 The "core requirement" is that the claim-
ant know the evidence, have the opportunity to address its accuracy
and reliability, and have the decision-maker consider the evidence
before deciding the appeal.8 7 The plan must also provide reasons
for the initial denial that are specific, rather than conclusory, in
order to permit a meaningful appeal.88
2. Remedies Provided: Judicial Review
If the patient's claim is denied in the grievance procedure, the
patient can seek judicial review in state or federal courts for a
breach of the obligation to pay under the plan's contract. No dam-
82. Grossmuller v. International Union, 715 F.2d 853, 857 (3d Cir. 1983) (dis-
cussing intent of ERISA claims to be settled through internal resolution
procedures).
83. 29 U.S.C. § 1133 (1988) (providing for notification and review of benefit
denial determinations under ERISA).
84. 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1 (f) (requiring specifically that notice of denial of
benefits include reference to plan provisions on which denial is based, any infor-
mation that, if submitted, might perfect claim, and steps which must be taken to
pursue appeal).
85. In Brown v. Retirement Comm. of Briggs & Stratton Retirement Plan, 797
F.2d 521 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1094 (1987), the United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that awritten record was sufficient for a fidu-
ciary to make a claim denial decision. Brown, 797 F.2d at 534. However, the Sev-
enth Circuit's analysis was based on the "arbitrary and capricious" standard of
review. Id. at 525. In Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101 (1989),
the Supreme Court held that claims of breach of fiduciary duty should be reviewed
de novo, rather than the "arbitrary and capricious" standard. Firestone, 489 U.S. at
115.
86. Brown, 797 F.2d at 534.
87. Id. at 534 (citing Grossmuller v. International Union, 715 F.2d 853, 858
n.5) (3d Cir. 1983) (describing core requirements of plan administrator's
review)).
88. Weaver v. Phoenix Home Life Mut. Ins. Co., 990 F.2d 154, 157 (4th Cir.
1993).
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ages are available beyond those for breach of contract.89 The
courts make a de novo determination in the interpretation of con-
tract terms, but they will apply a deferential arbitrary and capricious
standard of review with respect to matters vested by the contract to
the discretion of the plan administrators. 90
The underlying premise of the law is that plan administrators
are fiduciaries, with responsibilities both to the general group of
employees in conserving funds and to the particular claimant. The
duty to the particular patient requires good faith in handling the
patient's claims and in dealing with the grievance. Furthermore,
the Supreme Court has recognized that Congress intended to have
the federal courts develop "a federal common law" under ERISA to
implement the plan's obligations. 91
3. ERISA Remedies as a Means of Relief
The ERISA remedies provide some recourse for claimants,
although the adequacy of the relief has also been questioned. 92
a. Requirement for Specific Reasons
ERISA requires that "specific reasons" be given for denials,
making conclusory explanations inappropriate. 93 Patients and phy-
89. See, e.g., Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134 (1985)
(denying relief based on preemption basis); Lafoy v. HMO Colo., 988 F.2d 97, 99-
101 (10th Cir. 1993) (denying extra-contractual relief, including compensatory
damages based on ERISA provision). Damages have been awarded, though, when
the failure to provide information by the plan led employees not to take advantage
of the opportunity to obtain coverage. See Bixler v. Central Pa. Teamster Health &
Welfare Fund, 12 F.3d 1292, 1302-03 (3d Cir. 1993) (holding employer may have
breached fiduciary duty by failing to inform beneficiary of available benefits after
employer withdrew from plan); Warren v. Society Nat'l Bank, 905 F.2d 975, 981-82
(6th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 952 (1991) (holding participant in retirement
plan was entitled to monetary damages because trustee breached fiduciary duty).
90. See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 110-11 (1989)
(holding that "ERISA abounds with the language and terminology of trust law"
and that trust principles require "a deferential standard of review . . .when a
trustee exercises discretionary powers"); DeWitt v. State Farm Ins. Co., 905 F.2d
798, 800-01 (4th Cir. 1990) (refusing to subject retirement plan trustee's denial of
benefits to de novo review because plan at issue vested discretion in plan adminis-
trator); Pirozzi v. Blue Cross - Blue Shield, 741 F. Supp. 586, 589 (E.D. Va. 1990)
(stating doctor's decision to deny benefits is subject to de novo review only when
health plan confers no discretion on administrator).
91. Firestone, 489 U.S. at 110 (citing Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41,
56 (1987); Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1,
24 n.26 (1983)).
92. See Paul O'Neil, Protecting FIJSA Health Care Claimant: A Practical Assessment
of a Neglected Issue in Health Care Reform, 55 OHIo ST. LJ. 723 (1994) (criticizing
ERISA as defensive shield that disadvantages claimants).
93. 29 U.S.C. § 1133(1) (1988).
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sicians who receive conclusory denials should insist on a specifica-
tion of the grounds for the decision in accordance with the
statutory requirements.
b. Attorney's Fees and Access to Court
Under ERISA, courts can award reasonable attorney's fees. 94
The availability of fees makes it more feasible to bring some chal-
lenges. The award of fees is discretionary, though, and the lack of
mandatory awards can be a disincentive.95
A number of cases have challenged the denial of benefits for
autologous bone marrow and other transplants. These cases have
presented an urgency for resolution because the patients had termi-
nal conditions. While the insurers have won a few of these cases,
they generally have not fared well. 96 Even when the arbitrary and
capricious standard applied, the determinations have been over-
turned for failure to consider adequately the patient's situation or
the degree of acceptance of the procedures in the medical
community. 97
Indeed, according to one report, the insurers now generally
settle this type of experimental surgery case for considerable sums
once a lawsuit is brought. Thus, the way to prevail in a medical
necessity dispute is said to be to "hire a lawyer."
98
94. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g) (1) (1988).
95. See O'Neil, supra note 92, at 769-70 (asserting that lack of mandatory
award of attorney's fees makes it difficult for ERISA claimants to obtain legal repre-
sentation); see also Ann C. Bertio, Note, The Need for a Mandatory Award of Attorney's
Fees for Prevailing Plaintiffs inERISA Benefits Cases, 41 CATH. U. L. REv. 871, 872-73 &
n.17, 884-86 (1992) (contending that plaintiff's attorneys have no incentive to ac-
cept ERISA claims when award of attorney's fees is not mandatory).
96. See Paul J. Molino, Reimbursement Disputes Involving Experimental Medical
Treatment, 24 J. HEALTH & Hosp. L. 329, 329 (1991) (surveying recent cases and
concluding that it is "increasingly difficult" for insurers to draft experimental ex-
clusions that courts will sustain). Compare Jones v. Laborers Health & Welfare
Trust Fund, 906 F.2d 480, 481-82 (9th Cir. 1990) (upholding trust fund's exclusion
of experimental treatment) with Pirozzi v. Blue Cross - Blue Shield, 741 F. Supp.
586, 589-95 (E.D. Va. 1990); Rollo v. Blue Cross - Blue Shield, No. CIVA.90-597,
1990 WL 312647, at *7-9 (D.NJ. Mar. 22, 1990) and Ponder v. Blue Cross - Blue
Shield, 193 Cal. Rptr. 632, 638-42 (Ct. App. 1983) (finding treatment covered de-
spite exclusionary language).
97. See, e.g., Rolo, 1990 WL 312647, at *7 (applying deferential standard but
overturning insurer's denial for failure to acknowledge studies that were con-
ducted that involved particular procedure issue); see also Molino, supra note 96, at
334 (discussing designation of board of medical specialists to determine experi-
mental treatment as well as drafting changes); Hall & Anderson, supra note 17, at
1654-57 (discussing court's unwillingness to enforce contract terms over possible
loss of life).
98. See Gina Rolata, Patients' Lawyers Lead Insurers to Pay for Unproven Treat-
ments, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 1994, at Al (commenting on growing disputes between
[Vol. 40: p. 153
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E. Limitations of ERISA Remedies
1. Smaller Claims
The cost of bringing cases, though, can be high. In cases chal-
lenging denials of benefits for experimental surgery, the cost of at-
torneys has been approximately $10,000. 99 The experimental
surgery cases involve large medical costs, typically approximately
$100,000, making the costs of litigation feasible. In more routine
cases, bringing a lawsuit to obtain relief is not as practical. The
patient can also have the same difficulty in establishing damages
that occur with other contract cases. 100
2. Independence of Reviewers
Whether the reviewers who make medical necessity determina-
tions are sufficiently independent presents an important issue that
has arisen in different contexts. The lack of independence may be
questioned because the decisions on appeal are made by those in-
volved in the earlier review. The participation of an initial reviewer
in the final decision is not impermissible. 101
The lack of independence can also arise if the medical director
or other decision-makers have a financial stake in denying benefits.
There has been a report of a director who was eligible for a bonus
when the company made a profit.10 2 The existence of a personal
financial stake in the outcome would be disqualifying in other
proceedings.103
patients' lawyers and insurance companies); see also William P. Peters & Marc C.
Rogers, Variation in Approval by Insurance Companies of Coverage for Autologous Bone
Marrow Transplantation for Breast Cancer, 330 NEw ENG. J. MED. 473, 476 ("The fact
that denials of coverage were frequently reversed when an attorney became in-
volved may offer patients some consolation, but as a policy this approach is to be
strongly discouraged.").
99. Kolata, supra note 98, at Al (discussing rise of patients' representation by
attorneys in insurance disputes).
100. For a discussion of the difficulty in establishing damages, see supra notes
78-79 and accompanying text.
101. See Sweatman v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 39 F.3d 594, 598-99 (5th
Cir. 1994) (stating that it is "both legally and factually inaccurate" to argue that
review must involve party other than person who initially denied claim).
102. 20/20, (ABC television broadcast, Apr. 15, 1994) (reporting $89 million
jury verdict and subsequent settlement). This 20/20 broadcast also reported that a
medical director was denied benefits when an expensive transplant operation was
performed. Id. Also, an executive in a for-profit corporation became eligible for
bonus when the company made a profit. Id.
103. See Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975) (stating that in judicial and
administrative proceedings, decision maker's "pecuniary interest in the outcome"
would create "probability of actual bias" that would be "too high to be constitution-
ally tolerable").
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Difficult questions about the independence of the process also
arise from the organization's stake in cutting costs. The cost reduc-
tions can benefit the plan's economic health. The increased com-
petition involved in managed care accentuates these concerns. The
viability of the plan, or its selection as the plan administrator, may
be at stake if the plan cannot hold down costs as well as its competi-
tors. The director of the program can be identified with the success
of cost-cutting efforts as to be perceived to be reluctant to grant
appeals that raise fiscal concerns. 10 4
On the other hand, the cost-cutting efforts also benefit the
members of the plan by potentially reducing their health care costs.
The denial of benefits can be seen as serving the interests of the
beneficiaries generally, rather than as self-serving cost-cutting by
the plan. The difficulty is that the denial of benefits can serve both
interests. The savings can benefit the other subscribers, as well as
having an organizational benefit. The insurer's organizational in-
terest should be recognized as a potential conflict and one that war-
rants some added safeguards to provide assurance that the plan
decision-makers have carefully considered the decision on its
merits.105
The case law under ERISA does not preclude a decision on
appeal by those with some conflict of interest. The existence of a
conflict, though, is a factor that is considered under the arbitrary
and capricious test when discretion is vested in the insurer.10 6 An
insurer has been found to have an "inherent conflict" when an em-
ployer offers benefits to employees through health insurance for a
fixed sum, with any payments for benefits reducing the insurer's
own funds.10 7
104. For examples of Directors being affected by fiscal considerations, see
Helvestine, supra note 1, at 174. In Health Maintenance Organizations, where the
plan provides the care as well as the reimbursement, the conflicts with economic
interest can be accentuated. See Stern, supra note 75, at 920-24.
105. The significance of the insurer's financial self-interest was recognized in
determining the due process protection needed for Medicare programs where an
insurer administered the program, but the government funded it. Schweiker v.
McClure, 456 U.S. 188, 196-97 (1982) (holding that insurer is not shown to be
biased absent showing of financial interest by company that was not established
when funds for the program were "federal and not [the insurer's] own funds").
106. See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 112 (1989) (cit-
ing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 4 cmt. d (1959)) (stating that other evi-
dence of decision maker's intentions with respect to trust is admissible); Sweatman
v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 39 F.3d 594, 599 (5th Cir. 1994) (holding that dis-
trict court "properly reviewed" insurer's decision when court weighed insurer's
possible conflict of interest as factor in arbitrary and capricious test).
107. See Sweatman, 39 F.3d at 599 (recognizing insurer's conflict of interest as
both plan insurer and claims administrator); Brown v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield,
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To deal with the potential for conflict, the lower courts have
developed different approaches. Some may use a sliding scale ap-
proach that decreases deference in proportion to the seriousness of
the conflict with the application of the standard shaped by the cir-
cumstances.108 Other courts use a two-tier approach and defer un-
til serious unfairness is shown; the courts then shift the burden to
the insurer to show that the decision furthers the interests of the
beneficiaries generally. 10 9 Under this approach the claimant may
have the burden to demonstrate through "material probative evi-
dence" that self-interest caused a breach beyond the mere fact of an
apparent conflict." 0 A need for "caution" has also been recognized
when giving insurers the degree of deference accorded administra-
tive agencies, because the insurers are not as publicly accountable
as the agencies and the insurers are more subject to economic
pressures."' 
I
Judicial review, then, can provide some protection against the
economic pressure that a payer may face, because review will take
account of the potential conflict in applying the arbitrary and capri-
cious test for review when discretion is granted. This safeguard,
though, is not completely sufficient. The beneficiary denied bene-
fits must be able to afford to bring a lawsuit to benefit from any
weight given to the conflict during review. Furthermore, the im-
pact that the potential conflict will have on review is not clear and is
shaped by the particular factual setting. The claimant may have to
demonstrate in some specific way how the potential conflict af-
fected the particular dispute. With such an indeterminate stan-
898 F.2d 1556, 1561-63 (11th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1040 (1991) (stating
that benefits determinations made by insurance company administering its own
policy poses an "inherent conflict").
108. See, e.g., Doe v. Group Hospitalization, 3 F.3d 80, 87 (4th Cir. 1993) (re-
viewing to determine whether denial is "consistent with exercise of discretion by a
fiduciary acting free" of conflict). But see, Sweatman, 39 F.3d at 599 (holding that
inherent conflict of interest does not affect standard of review).
109. See, e.g., Atwood v. Newmont Gold Co., 45 F.3d 1317, 1323 (9th Cir.
1994) (indicating that "the plan bears the burden of producing evidence to show
that the conflict of interest did not affect the decision to deny benefits" when ben-
eficiary produces evidence that insurer violated fiduciary obligation); Brown, 898
F.2d at 1566-67 (ruling that, under principles of federal common law, burden
shifts to insurer to prove that its decision was not "tainted by self-interest").
110. Atwood, 45 F.3d at 1323 (emphasizing need for heightened scrutiny of
administrator's discretion once claimant meets burden through "material proba-
tive evidence").
111. Brown, 898 F.2d at 1556, 1564 n.7 (I1th Cir. 1990) (recognizing that def-
erence given to administrative agencies should not be applied broadly to insurer's
decision making because insurers are subject to economic pressures and shielded
from outside political pressures).
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dard, it may be difficult to establish the added significance to be
given to the conflict on review.
The recent explosive growth of managed competition exacer-
bates the concern with the independence and fairness of grievance
procedures. Cutting back on medically unnecessary costs is a key
way to control costs. As firms compete to control the costs, eco-
nomic factors could affect their discretionary decisions-such as
the availability of exceptions-in ways that are difficult to identify.
There is also likely to be the perception that the plans have a finan-
cial interest in denying benefits which affect their objectivity. The
impact of that conflict may be difficult to demonstrate, yet it has a
potential to erode confidence in the fairness of the process. With
for-profit plans, this perception will be accentuated. The increas-
ingly competitive nature of health care plans, thus, creates the need
for additional safeguards beyond the uncertain prospect ofjudicial
review to correct conflicts.
V. ADDITIONAL SAFEGUARDS
One means of providing additional safeguards would be to leg-
islate health care reforms that would provide an external adminis-
trative review of medical necessity disputes. The Clinton Health
Care Plan would have established state-run review offices to resolve
disputes brought by patients about denials of benefits by health
care plans. 112 The state decisions would have been subject to lim-
ited federal administrative and court review.113
The Clinton Health Care Plan faltered, in part, because of the
objections to the additional level of bureaucracy that would be cre-
ated. Developing fair administrative procedures for mass benefit
programs presents challenging issues.114 There also are various
models for administrative review. 115 This article does not consider
whether an administrative forum is appropriate and the form it
112. Health Security Act, H.R 3600, S. 1757, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 5202
(1993).
113. Id. § 5205 (subjecting decision to review by Federal Health Plan Review
Board and permitting appeal of Board's decision to United States Court of
Appeals).
114. See generallyJERRY L. MASHAW, BuREAucRATIcJuSTICE: MANAGING SOCIAL
SECURITY DISABILITY CLAIMS 21-41 (1983) (discussing difficulty in maintaining both
fairness and efficiency in administrative process used by Social Security Administra-
tion for disability benefits program).
115. See Eleanor D. Kinney, Protecting Consumers and Providers Under Health Re-
form: An Overview of the Major Administrative Law Issues, 5 HEALTH MATRIX 83, 95-108
(1995); Susan J. Stayn, Note, Securing Access to Care in Health Maintenance Organiza-
tions: Towards a Uniform Model of Grievance and Appeal Procedures, 94 COLUM. L. REv.
1674, 1709-20 (1994) (recommending Medicare grievance model).
[Vol. 40: p. 153
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should take. At present, there is no prospect for legislation that
would mandate separate administrative forums for review. Reforms
that work within a framework of private insurance would be more
likely to win acceptance. Discussed below are two measures that
can provide additional safeguards to ensure a fair procedure for
privately-provided health insurance. These procedures relate to a
procedural audit and the availability of second opinions for dis-
putes involving the risk of serious impairment.
A. Procedural Audit
1. Aim of the Audit
Health plan payers should sponsor a system of independent
audits that selectively sample the adequacy of the claims' determi-
nations and dispute resolution by the plan. A summary of the re-
sults of the audit should appear in the plan's brochure provided to
subscribers. Under this approach, an auditing staff would review a
random sample of the medical necessity decisions made by the
plan. The decisions would be evaluated by appropriate criteria cov-
ering the accuracy, timeliness and fairness of the decision-making
process. 116 The review would examine how well the plan observed
the accepted process for making decisions, such as providing timely
notice and adequate statements of the basis of the decision. The
auditors would also consider complaints filed by patients. An over-
all evaluation of the plan's performance would be made, along with
any recommendations for improvements or clarification of the
plan's criteria. A summary of the audit report would be made avail-
able to subscribers in order to provide a better means of making
choices among plans.
This type of procedural audit is appropriate within a scheme of
private health insurance precisely because it facilitates choice by the
consumers on an informed basis. The plans could also be expected
to improve performance to avoid a negative evaluation. Of course,
it would be necessary to ensure that the audits themselves were fair
and accurate in their evaluation. Poor audits would damage the
plans and mislead the subscribers. The identity, therefore, of the
sponsoring organization is key.
116. SeeJerry L. Mashaw, The Management Side of Due Process: Some Theoretical
and Litigation Notes on the Assurance of Accuracy, Fairness and Timeliness in the Adjudi-
cation of Social Welfare Claims, 59 Co, tNu L. REv. 772, 774 (1974) (suggesting that
there is "an increasing interest" in these criteria); Recommendation 73-3 of the
Administrative Conference of the United States, 3 C.F.R. Recommend. 73-3
(1995).
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2. Establishment of Audit Panels
There could be different types of sponsors for an auditing pro-
gram. An audit by governmental regulators would provide an ad-
ded assurance of independence. The framework suggested here,
though, reflects an effort at self-regulation by payers to establish
audits that can claim to be independent. Under this approach
there would be a panel to supervise the audit program. The panel
would be made up of representatives of health insurance payers,
medical providers, patient representatives and those with an exper-
tise in procedural systems, such as retired judges. The panels, es-
tablished on a statewide basis, would develop the criteria used in
the audits, such as an acceptable level of errors or the norm for
timeliness. In addition, the panel would arrange for hiring the au-
ditors to do the actual audits. The audit staff would be made up of
individuals with relevant expertise. Lastly, the panel would issue
the audit report after considering the comments of the payer
affected.
The appointment of the panel would reflect its self-regulatory
nature. Health care payers would have to initiate the efforts to
form the panels. To safeguard the independence of the endeavor,
at least half of the panel should consist of those not connected with
payers. Medical organizations should be asked to designate medi-
cal representatives. To make self-regulation work properly, it also is
important to have representation by those with interests that are
adversely affected by claims denials.1 17 Accordingly, a special effort
should be made to secure adequate representation of patients' in-
terests. Organizations that have a special interest in treating partic-
ular illnesses, such as cancer or arthritis, would be a good source
for representatives that are attuned to the patients' concerns.
Any participation by the payers in the audited program may be
questioned as inconsistent with the aim of having an independent
procedural audit. To induce the payers to establish an audit pro-
gram, though, the payers can be expected to want to have a role
that will enable them to prevent what they would perceive as mis-
taken standards or poor judgment. Moreover, to make a self-regu-
latory program work, the various adversely-affected interests need
to participate."" In addition, because there are no established
117. See Douglas C. Michael, Federal Agency Use of Audited Self-Regulation as a
Regulatory Technique, 47 ADMIN. L. REv. 171, 226 (1995) (stating that experience
with health care financing suggests "that it is difficult for a self-regulatory program
to succeed if opposing groups are not given meaningful input in the process").
118. Id. (emphasizing need for opposing groups' participation in self-regula-
tory system).
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standards for judging these procedural systems, these standards
need to be formulated. The payers have an important insight to
contribute about the appropriate criteria.
The participation of payer-industry representatives, though, is
a complicating factor, 'especially when the panel is reviewing the
audit for a particular payer. Any representative from that particular
company inevitably is faced with a conflict of interest. Representa-
tives of other companies may have a competitive advantage to gain
from an adverse report on another company. Thus, the payer rep-
resentatives should probably not vote on the decision whether to
issue an audit report for a particular company. If they are allowed
to participate when their own company is not directly involved,
there may need to be an opportunity for arbitration to resolve con-
tentions by the affected payer that the audit is unwarranted and has
been affected by competitive concerns.
3. Incentive to Establish Audit Program
The incentive for payers to establish such a program would be
to safeguard patient confidence in the fairness of the procedural
relief provided by the payers. Confidence is important in its own
right and is a matter that the payers, as fiduciaries, should want to
ensure. Moreover, if numbers of patients believe that the grievance
procedures of the payer are "stacked" and provide no relief, there
may be pressure for Congress or state legislatures to provide addi-
tional recourse and forms of review of payer decisions. Finally, the
existence of an audit may make courts more willing to accept the
decisions of the payers as non-arbitrary and as providing a "full and
fair review" under ERISA.
If such programs are not established voluntarily, then a legisla-
tive requirement for such audits should be considered. The regula-
tory standards governing HMOs could conceivably be amended to
require some type of procedural audit.119 In any legislatively estab-
lished program, the program should ensure clear standards, public
access to its records and authority for a regulatory agency to review
the audit program. 120 In a self-regulatory program voluntarily es-
119. See 42 U.S.C. § 300e(c) (5) (1988) (requiring grievance procedures for
HMOs but not establishing specific standards); Stayn, supra note 115, at 1702 (indi-
cating that individuals who plan to enroll in federally-qualified HMO have no way
of learning of particular HMO's noncompliance and that existing federal system
"provides minimal substantive and procedural protection for non-Medicare mem-
ber of HMOs").
120. See Recommendation 94-1 of the Administrative Conference of the
United States, The Use of Self-Regulation as a Regulatoy Technique, 3 C.F.R. Recom-
mend. 94-1 (1995); cf Michael, supra note 117, at 189-95 (discussing how proce-
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tablished along the lines recommended here, the program should
endeavor to meet the criteria for an effective and fair program that
have been recommended for programs under government
auspices.
B. Second Opinions in Disputes Involving Risks of Serious Impairment
Health plans should also have a policy of providing second
opinions as a means of resolving disputes involving cases where pa-
tients may suffer serious impairment if denied services. Health
plans should offer patients with these serious conditions the oppor-
tunity for a second opinion at least when the issue turns on a factual
dispute or when the patient has raised substantial grounds for be-
lieving an exception to the usual criteria are warranted.
1. Advantages of Second Opinions
For patients, the use of second opinions to resolve disputes
about medical necessity determinations has clear advantages. First,
the accuracy of the decision can be promoted by a direct contact
between the patient and the physician. Second, when a patient is
hospitalized and a dispute arises about prospective treatment, the
opportunity for a second opinion can be reassuring for the patient,
no matter what the outcome. In addition, a consultation in the hos-
pital also permits a more timely resolution. 121 The length of time
for grievance procedures to operate is currently a "major weakness"
when issues arise concerning hospitalized patients. 122 Finally, sec-
ond opinions also offer the opportunity to have involvement by
those not previously involved in the decision.
Some insurers now provide or require the use of second opin-
ions to advise on the need for certain operations. 123 Because
second opinions are relevant in the insurer's judgment in discour-
aging unnecessary surgery, the opinions should also be considered
to be relevant as a fair procedure in resolving other disputes about
when further care is unnecessary.
dure of any self-regulatory program is subject to due process requirements that
ensure fairness).
121. See Stayn, supra note 115, at 1712-13 (discussing advantage for patients
and providers of second opinion procedure established by Illinois statute).
122. See Helvestine, supra note 1, at 193 (discussing need for expedited judi-
cial relief to solve lengthy grievance procedure problems).
123. See Blue Cross and Blue Shield of New Jersey, Your Medallion Health Care
Coverage (1995). Under this type of program, the patient can consult any physician
who has agreed to participate in the program, with the cost borne by the insurer.
[Vol. 40: p. 153
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2. Concerns About Second Opinions: Selection of Physicians
Payers, though, can be expected to be reluctant to provide for
second opinions for several reasons. They may be concerned about
the selection of the physician providing the opinion and the criteria
to be used. In addition, the cost of the opinions will be an impor-
tant factor. The physicians providing the opinions would be subject
to tort liability for malpractice, which may make it more difficult to
obtain their participation.
The physicians providing the second opinions should be those
who are participating providers of the payer's health care plan.
The physician should be a practicing physician in the relevant spe-
cialty. While the physician might be selected solely by the payer,
the results would be more acceptable and fair if made with the con-
currence of the patient and patient's physician. The opinions
would still be governed by the plan's criteria for medical necessity.
If there is any challenge to the legal validity of the criteria, that
challenge should be made by pursuing other applicable remedies.
The physician providing the second opinion, as well as the treating
physician, should be protected against retaliation for reaching a de-
termination adverse to the payer. 124
3. Limitations of Second Opinions
The cost of second opinions is an important concern and the
availability of this remedy should be limited to areas where the use
of second opinions is most warranted on a policy basis.
a. Factual Disputes and Risks of Serious Impairment
If the need for further care turns on a dispute about the pa-
tient's physical condition and the condition involves a risk of seri-
ous impairment, resolution by a second opinion or referral is
appropriate.1 25 The risk of serious health consequences if care is
not provided warrants the provision of more safeguards.
The physician providing the second opinion should ordinarily
observe the patient. If the physician determines that the matter
can be reliably determined by consultation of the medical records,
124. For a discussion of a program that provides protection to physicians, see
Stayn, supra note 115, at 1713.
125. The Health Security Act Amendments considered in the last Congress
provided for expedited administrative review of any disputes involving "serious im-
pairment" of bodily functions or other "serious" harm. See H.R. 7509, 103d Cong.,
2d Sess. § 9302(c) (2) (as amended Aug. 10, 1994); S. 7509, 103d Cong., 2d Sess.
§ 5501(c) (1995).
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some contact with the patient should be made by phone. A medical
contact with the hospitalized patient can probe further into the pa-
tient's condition at the actual time at issue to determine if there are
special factors or additional tests needed. When a medical necessity
dispute turns on such a factual dispute, there may be no other alter-
native means of resolving the matter reliably. Indeed, a second
opinion may be necessary to ensure a "full and fair review" under
ERISA.12 6 When these factual disputes arise, the payer should bear
the cost of the second opinion.
b. Significant Exceptional Circumstances Involving Serious
Impairments
Situations can arise when exceptions may be warranted to the
general criteria governing reimbursement.12 7 If a patient raises sig-
nificant grounds to show there are special factors to justify an ex-
ception, with respect to a condition involving a risk of serious
impairment, referral for a second opinion is useful in evaluating
the issue. The opinion can provide some counterweight to the ten-
dency to treat the matter by the usual rules without focusing on
special factors. Physicians, through their practice, gain the experi-
ence to judge when there are compelling circumstances in which
fairness warrants a different approach. There is a risk that some
patients will readily claim exceptions. To encourage more realistic
claims, the patient should have to share the cost for the second
opinion.128
The second opinions need not necessarily be given conclusive
weight, but if the insurer did not accept the result, the insurer
would need to provide strong support for reaching a different
result.
VI. CONCLUSION
The effort to control medical care costs carries the risk that
health insurers or managed care providers will inappropriately de-
termine that medical care is unnecessary. These determinations of
medical inappropriateness can be especially difficult ones for hospi-
talized patients suffering from traumatic injuries or sudden ill-
126. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 115 (1989) (discuss-
ing need for de novo review for participant's denial of benefits).
127. See Helvestine, supra note 1, at 178 ("If criteria are used, there should be
procedures available to allow the reviewer to deviate from them in individual cases
of medical necessity.").
128. If the patient is indigent, the need for a co-payment should be waived.
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nesses. These patients need timely notice of any planned denial of
benefits, an identification of discharge alternatives and an adequate
explanation of benefits. This additional information can help the
patient to become his or her own advocate in seeking the appropri-
ate type of care. The physician's role in determining care is increas-
ingly managed and incentives are being created to reduce costs and
the services prescribed. The patient will need to take a more active
role in evaluating whether his or her needs are being sufficiently
considered. Greater clarity about the general criteria for medical
necessity determinations would further the public's understanding
in choosing among plans. Health care policies should provide ex-
amples of the type of care they provide for a number of important
conditions.
Lastly, the competitive nature of managed care raises at least a
perception that disputes about medical necessity of treatment may
be affected by the payer's competitive interest in restraining costs.
Judicial review can provide some check to ensure that the decisions
are made on the merits, but review is not a practical recourse in
many cases. Measures need to be developed that will enhance the
fairness of the process. Procedural audits and opportunities for sec-
ond opinions in special cases are steps that could further that aim.
Making sure the disputes are fairly decided is important to the
health of us all.
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